M U X I S M 



these branches of science mediaeval traditions retain a 

 good deal of their power. Most of their ollicial repre- 

 sentatives cling to prejudices and superstitions of all 

 sorts, and very slowly and gradually admit the ac- 

 quisitions of pure reason as embodied in monistic an- 

 throj^ology and psychology. The intellectual life was 

 in many respects more advanced at the beginning of the 

 nineteenth than of the twentieth century. 



This classification of the chief branches of knowledge 

 in their relation to philosophy, the comprehensive science 

 of general truths, is naturally only a provisional and 

 personal sketch. It is especially dithcult from the cir- 

 cumstance that all the sciences have very complex rela- 

 tions to each other, and have undergone many changes 

 as to their aims and subjects in the course of their his- 

 torical development. I will only point out that a good 

 deal of science — in fact, the rational sciences with exact 

 mathematical basis — have now been comi)letely won 

 over to monism; and in the semi-dogmatic sciences it 

 is gaining ground from day to day, so that we may hope 

 sooner or later to see the four dogmatic sciences also, 

 the strong bulwarks of dualism — sociology, politics, 

 jurisprudence, and theolog}'' — succumb to monism. For 

 the ultimate aim of all the sciences can only be the 

 unitv of their underlying principles, or their harmonious 

 unification by pure reason. 



It is now more and more generally acknowledged in 

 educated countries that a complete reform of our educa- 

 tional curriculum is needed, both in elementary and 

 secondary schools and at the universities. The great 

 struggle between two different tendencies assumes larger 

 proportions ever}' day. On the one hand, most govern- 

 ments, following their conservative instinct, cling as fnr 

 as possible to mediaeval traditions, and find support in 

 the dogmatic teaching of theology and jurisprudence. 

 On the other hand, the representatives of pure reason 



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