io6 HUXLEY MEMORIAL LECTURES 



between this being and yourself. So let us follow 

 up this reasoning by analogy, and ask ourselves 

 up to what point it is probable that consciousness 

 may be imputed to nature, and at what point it 

 probably stops short. 



One reply sometimes made to the question is 

 this : In ourselves, consciousness is bound up in 

 one way or another with a brain; we may there- 

 fore assume the presence of consciousness in all 

 those living beings in whom a brain is found, and 

 in those alone. But a moment's reflection will 

 show us the fallacy of this reasoning. For in 

 applying elsewhere this mode of argument, we 

 might as well say : digestion in us is bound up 

 with a stomach, therefore we ought to attribute 

 the faculty of digestion to the living beings who 

 possess stomachs, and to those alone. Now this 

 would be absolutely wrong, for living beings who 

 have no stomachs and even no organs, which con- 

 sist of a simple protoplasmic mass, are still able 

 to digest. Only, in proportion as the organism 

 becomes more perfect, a division of labour is 

 brought about : special organs are destined to 

 diverse functions instead of the whole mass doing 

 all, and the digestive faculty becomes localised in 

 a stomach and in other organs which accomplish 

 it better -, whilst the rest of the organism renounces 

 the faculty, having got rid of this care by putting 

 it on to a special organ. But the function was 

 previously performed in the undifferentiated 

 organism : it was performed all over it, though 



