392 ETHICS 



for it a far more significant position in the whole scheme of human 

 thought. 



The question of the relation of ethics to the sciences implies a view 

 of the nature of ethics itself and, in particular, of the fundamental 

 concept used in ethical judgments. If the nature of this concept and 

 its relation to the concepts employed in other branches of inquiry 

 can be determined, the relations of ethics will become clear of them- 

 selves. The problem of this paper will receive its most adequate 

 solution so far as the time at my disposal permits by an in- 

 dependent inquiry into the nature of the ethical concept in relation 

 to the concepts used in other sciences. 



The immediate judgments of experience fall into two broadly 

 contrasted classes, which may be described in brief as judgments 

 of fact and judgments of worth. The former are the foundations 

 on which the whole edifice of science (as the term is commonly used) 

 is built. Science has no other object than to understand the relations 

 of facts as exhibited in historical sequence, in causal interconnection, 

 or in the logical interdependence which may be discovered amongst 

 their various aspects. In its beginnings it may have arisen as an aid 

 to the attainment of practical purposes: it is still everywhere yoked 

 to the chariot of man's desires and aims. But it has for long 

 vindicated an independent position for itself. It may be turned to 

 what uses you will; but its essential spirit stands aloof from these 

 uses. .It has one interest only, to know what happens and how. 

 Otherwise it is indifferent to all purposes alike. It studies with 

 equal mind the slow growth of a plant or the swift destruction 

 wrought by the torpedo, the reign of a Caligula or of a Victoria; it 

 takes no side, but observes and describes all "just as if the question 

 were of lines, planes, and solids." Mathematical method does not 

 limit its range, but it typifies its attitude of indifference to every 

 interest save one, that of knowing the what and how of things. 



We can conceive an intelligence of this nature, a pure intelligence, 

 or mere intelligence, to whose understanding all the relations of 

 things are evident, with the prophetic power of the Laplacian Demon 

 and the gift of tongues to make its knowledge clear, and yet unable to 

 distinguish between good and evil or to see beauty or ugliness in 

 nature. We can cor reive such an intelligence; but it is an unreality, 

 a mere abstraction from the scientific aspect of human intelligence. 

 Pure intelligence of this sort does not exist in man, and we have no 

 grounds for asserting its existence anywhere. In the experience 

 which forms the basis of mental life, judgments of reality are every- 

 where combined with and colored by judgments of worth. And the 

 latter are as insistent as the former, and make up as large a part of 

 our experience. If we go back to the original judgments of experi- 

 ence, we find that they are not only of the form "it is here or there," 



