THE RELATIONS OF ETHICS 399 



Moral judgments of a more mature kind on the constitution and 

 course of nature form the material for optimistic and pessimistic 

 views of the world at least, when these views rise above the asser- 

 tion of a preponderance of pleasure or of pain in life. But, so far as 

 I can see, in such moral judgments nature is never looked upon as 

 consisting of dead mechanical sequences. It is because it is looked 

 upon as the expression of a living will or as in some way perhaps 

 very vaguely conceived animated by purpose or consciousness, that 

 we regard it as morally good or evil. Apart from some such theological 

 conception, it does not seem to me that the nature of things calls out 

 the attitude of moral approval or disapproval. Things are estimated 

 as useful for this or that end, they are seen and appreciated as 

 beautiful or the reverse, without any reference to them as due to an 

 inspiring or originating mind ; and in one or other of these references 

 the terms "good" or "bad" may be used. But when we use the 

 term good in its specifically moral signification, we do not apply 

 it to the inanimate, except in a derivate way, on account of the 

 relation in which these inanimate ' things stand to the moral ends 

 and character of conscious beings. 



So far, therefore, as the evidence of moral experience goes, it 

 does not support the view that the "good" is a quality which be- 

 longs to things out of relation to self-conscious activity. And, in so 

 far, the peculiarity of the moral experience would seem to be better 

 brought out by the conception "ought" than by the conception 

 "good." 



But here a difficulty arises at once. For how can we say that any- 

 thing ought to be done or to be except on the assumption that it is 

 antecedently good? Is not such antecedent and independent good- 

 ness necessary in order to justify the assertion that any one ought 

 to produce it? 



The question undoubtedly points to a difficulty; and if that diffi- 

 culty can be solved it may help to bring out the true significance of 

 the moral concept. The judgment which assigns the duty of an indi- 

 vidual according to which I or any one ought to adopt a certain 

 course of action involves a special application of the moral con- 

 cept. It binds the individual to a certain objective rule or end. The 

 individual's desires as mere facts of experience may point in an 

 altogether different direction; the purpose or volition contemplated 

 and approved by the moral judgment has in view the union of indi- 

 vidual striving with an end which is objective and, as objective, uni- 

 versal. This union involves an adaptation of two things which may 

 fall asunder, and which in every case of evil volition do fall asunder. 

 And the adaptation may be regarded from either side: on the side 

 of the individual, application to his individuality is implied; the 

 duty of one man is not just the same as the duty of any other; he 



