THE RELATIONS OF ETHICS 401 



things either on the universe as a whole, or on anything in the 

 universe which is not regarded as due to the will of man is only 

 justified if we regard these things as in some way expressing con- 

 sciousness; either as directly due to it, or as aiding it, or as in con- 

 flict with it. From any other point of view, to speak of things as good 

 or evil (unless in some non-ethical sense of these terms) seems out 

 of place, and is unsupported by the mode of application which be- 

 longs to the immediate judgments of the moral consciousness. If 

 the moral concept has significance beyond the range of the feelings 

 and desires of men, it is because the objects to which it applies are 

 the expression of mind. 



This is not put forward as a vindication of a spiritual idealism. 

 It is only a small contribution towards the meaning of "good." A 

 comprehensive idealism may not be the only view of reality with 

 which the conclusions reached so far will harmonize. But it is the 

 view with which they harmonize most simply. The conception of a 

 purpose to which all the events of the world are related is a form in 

 which the essential feature of idealism may be expressed; the view 

 of this purpose as good makes the idealism at the same time a moral 

 interpretation of reality, and allows of our classing each distinguish- 

 able event as good or evil according as it tends to the furtherance or 

 hindrance of that purpose. 



This doctrine of the significance and application of the ethical 

 concept would enable us to reach a definite view of the nature of 

 ethics and of the way in which it is related to the sciences and to 

 metaphysics. The ethical concept is based upon the primary facts 

 of the moral consciousness, just as scientific concepts have as their 

 basis the facts of direct experience. The primary facts of the moral 

 consciousness are themselves of the nature of judgment they are 

 approbations or disapprobations. But all facts of experience involve 

 judgments, though these judgments may be only of the form "it is 

 here" or "it is of this or that nature." Again, tne primary ethical 

 facts or judgments cannot be assumed to be of unquestionable val- 

 idity: we may approve what is not worthy of approval, or disap- 

 prove what ought to have been approved. Our moral judgments 

 claim validity; and their claim is of the nature of an assertion, not 

 that one simply feels in such and such a way, but that something 

 ought or ought not to be. They imply an objective standard. But 

 the objective standard, when more clearly understood, may modify 

 or even reverse them. Our primary ethical judgments all our 

 ethical judgments, indeed stand in need of revision and criti- 

 cism; and they receive this revision and criticism in the course of 

 the elaboration of the ethical concept and of its application to the 

 worlds of fact and possibility. In the same way it may be contended 

 that the direct judgments of experience upon which science is based 



