402 ETHICS 



need criticism and correction; though their variation may be less in 

 amount than the variation of moral judgments. The color-blind 

 man identifies red with green, and his judgment on this point has to 

 be reversed; the hypersensitive subject often confuses images with 

 percepts; exact observation needs a highly trained capacity. The 

 correction and criticism which is needed come from objective stand- 

 ards; and these are the result of the comparison of many experiences 

 and the work of many minds. 



It is no otherwise in the case of ethics. Criticism brings to light 

 inconsistencies in the primary judgments of approbation and disap- 

 probation as well as in the later developments of the moral judgment. 

 And these inconsistencies must be dealt with in a way similar to that 

 in which we deal with inconsistencies in the judgments of perception 

 and of science. The objective standard is not itself given once for 

 all; it has to be formed by accumulation and comparison of moral 

 experiences. Like the experiences on which science is based, these 

 have to be made as far as possible harmonious, and analysis has to 

 be employed to bring out the element of identity which often lurks 

 behind apparent contradiction. They have also to be made as com- 

 prehensive as possible, so that they may be capable of application to 

 all relevant facts, and that the scattered details of the moral con- 

 sciousness may be welded into an harmonious system. In these 

 general respects the criticism of ethical concepts proceeds upon the 

 same lines as the criticism of scientific concepts. The difference lies 

 in the concepts themselves, for ethics involves a point of view to 

 which science must always remain a stranger. 



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 



The relations of ethics are discussed in almost every ethical treatise; special 

 reference may be made to the writers who have worked out the theory of worth 

 or value, especially von Ehrenfels, System der Wert-theorie (1897); Meinong, Psy- 

 chologisch-Ethische Untersuchungen zur Werth-theorie (1894), and an article in 

 Archiv fur Syst. Phil. 1895; Krueger, Begriff der Absolut WertvoUen (1808); also 

 to articles by Standinger and by Natorp in Archiv fur Syst. Phil. (1896); by 

 Wentscher, Archiv fur Syst. Phil. 1899; by Westermarck, Mind, 1900; and by 

 Belot, Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale, 1905. W. R. S. 



