432 .ESTHETICS 



In my view some aid in the solution of this problem may be gained 

 from the examination of the meaning of our terms. From this study 

 I feel convinced that we must hold that when we speak of the True, 

 and the Good, and the Beautiful, as mutually exclusive as above, 

 we use the term "true" in a narrow sense. On the other hand, the 

 True is often used in a broader sense, as equivalent to the Real. 



This being so we may say 



That the Beautiful is the Real as discovered in the world of im- 

 pression; the relatively permanent pleasure which gives us the sense 

 of beauty being the most stable characteristic of those parts of the 

 field of impression which interest us we may also assent 



That the Good is the Real as discovered in the world of expression, 

 that is, of impulse, which is due to the inhibited capacity for expres- 

 sion, and the reaction of the self in its efforts to break down the 

 inhibition. And in the same way we may conclude 



That the True (using the term in the narrow sense) is the Real 

 as discovered in the realm of experience exclusive of impression or 

 expression. 



a. The Real of Impression The Beautiful 

 THE REAL 



J. The Real of Expression The Good 



(. The Real in realms The True 



exclusive of a and ft (in the narrower 



sense of the term) 



or 



THE TRUE 

 (in the broad sense 

 of the term) 



That the Beautiful is part of the REAL, that is, is always the 

 TRUE, using the term true in the broader sense, is not questioned: and 

 that, in my view, is the theoretical truth recognized by the aesthetic 

 realists. But in practice the aesthetic realist maintains that the 

 beautiful is always the true, using the term true in the narrow sense, 

 and in this, in my view, lies his error. 



And if the relation of the beautiful to the true demands the 

 attention of the philosopher, equally so does the relation of the 

 beautiful to the good. As I look upon it, all of the true (using the 

 term as above explained in the narrow sense) and all of the good, 

 so far as either involve relatively permanent pleasure of impression, 

 are possible elements of beauty. But, on the other hand, it seems clear 

 that neither the true (still using the term in the narrower sense), nor 

 the good, is necessarily pleasing, but may be unpleasant, and there- 

 fore either of them may be an element of ugliness, and as such must 

 lose all possibility of becoming an element in the beautiful. 



One further word, in closing, upon the closely allied question as 

 to the nature of worth-values. There is a worth-value involved 

 in the Good, and a worth-value involved in the True, and a worth- 



