THE RELATIONS OF AESTHETICS 433 



value involved in the Beautiful: and each of these worth-values 

 in itself seems to be involved with pleasure-getting. Now if this is 

 the case, then, under the theory I uphold, any worth-value should be 

 a possible aesthetic element, and this I think it will be granted is 

 true. But the distinctions between these worth-values are on differ- 

 ent planes, as it were. In the case of the worth-value of the Good, 

 we appreciate the worth-pleasure within the realm of the Real of 

 Expression, that is, of impulse. In the case of the worth-value of the 

 True (in the narrow sense) , we appreciate the worth-pleasure within 

 the realm of the Real in other fields than that of expression or that 

 of impression. In the case of the worth-value of the Beautiful, we 

 appreciate the worth-pleasure within the realm of the Real of Im- 

 pression; that is, we appreciate, with pleasure, the significance for 

 life of the existence of relatively permanent pleasure in and for 

 itself. 



