CONCEPTION AND METHODS OF HISTORY 43 



has said that the medieval mind discovered no more venerated 

 attribute of deity than Wilkiirlichkeit, that is, the seemingly arbi- 

 trary interference in the general trend of human and natural affairs. 

 For a thousand years the miracle, not the inconspicuous course of 

 natural law, riveted men's attention. Our inherent love of "a good 

 story/' our anxiety to conciliate the interest of our readers and 

 students, our excusable partiality for effective situations, all com- 

 bine to put the rather arid and esoteric idea of mere continuity at 

 a disadvantage. 



There are two phases of the continuity of history which should be 

 distinguished. In its most commonly accepted use, it is the observed 

 fact that every human institution, every generally accepted concep- 

 tion, every important invention, is but the culmination of a long 

 line of progress reaching back as far as we have the patience or 

 knowledge to trace it. In spite of this truth, it is certainly possible to 

 establish rather satisfactory periods in the development of any single 

 human interest. While no doubt the antecedents of the invention of 

 printing by movable types are many, there is nevertheless a sudden 

 and abrupt change for the world at large when the printing of a 

 whole Bible was completed at Mayence in the year 1456. Certainly 

 we may very properly begin an era in land transportation when a 

 steam locomotive makes its first trip on a railroad. 



But no single human interest is isolated from innumerable con- 

 current interests. This brings us to the broader conception of the 

 continuity of history which depends upon the complexity of men's 

 affairs. A somewhat abrupt change may take place in some single 

 institution or habit, but a sudden general change is absolutely incon- 

 ceivable. An individual may, through some change of environment, 

 through bereavement or a malignant disease, be quickly and funda- 

 mentally metamorphosed, but even this is extremely rare as any one's 

 experience will tell him. If all the habits and interests of individuals 

 are considered, it will be found that only in the rarest cases are any 

 great number of these altered in any brief period. In the case of 

 society, no general change has, so far as we know, ever taken place 

 abruptly. Every reformer knows how hopeless it is to attempt to 

 alter even a single popular habit. 



Now it is obvious that in so far as the historian confines himself 

 to some single dominant interest in the past, the sharp division of the 

 subject into periods is not by any means wholly preposterous or 

 misleading. One can hardly object to periods in the history of 

 philosophy, in the history of mechanical invention, in the history of 

 painting or music. When, however, we attempt to deal with the 

 general history of mankind, sharp divisions are absolutely impossible. 

 Politically the tenth of November, 1799, marks a period in French 

 history. At that time, there begins an abrupt and a thorough regu- 



