THE SCIENCE OF HISTORY 123 



enable one to recognize the antithetic tendencies of the human 

 mind in its whole empiric compass. 



Thus we get a starting-point from which the relation of modern 

 historical science to the other mental sciences may be explained. 

 These may be divided into applied, such as theology, jurisprudence, 

 political economy, politics, etc., and into constitutive, history of 

 language, literature, art, etc. It is clear that the constitutive branches 

 simply disappear as parts of modern historical science. For if the 

 latter concerns itself with the investigation of the dominating social 

 psyche of the times in question, and with its changing forms during 

 the various ages of culture, it can only do this by taking a survey of 

 all its embodiments in history from time to time. These are to be 

 found in language, in poetry, and art (that is, style), in science and 

 philosophy, the climax of intellectual attainment, argumentation, 

 etc. And correspondingly, socio-psychological history is the universal 

 foundation of all these sciences, and these are related to it as ampli- 

 fying and special sciences. But even more is the case with relation 

 to the applied mental sciences. For the latter, which have reference 

 to a certain given psyche of a certain cultural period, require a gen- 

 eral knowledge of this period, which leads to the socio-psychological 

 science of history. 



Historical science therefore plays a double part: (1) as the basis 

 of the practical as of the theoretical mental sciences, and (2) as 

 stimulus to an historical method within the range of psychology. It 

 is a position which is quite normally conditioned by the fact that 

 psychic movements pass, as regards time, far more rapidly than 

 physical movements, and that the change appears to us qualitatively 

 different on that account. If in their relations the psychic develop- 

 ments of a given time had corresponded to the physical, only one 

 mechanism would be needed to dominate them both; for they 

 would have shown a hundred thousand and more years ago the 

 same character as they show in the traditional records of to-day. 

 Now it is well known that where the conception of life is in question, 

 this is not the case; for example, in animal and plant organisms. In 

 human life, that is, in history, a moment of much quicker change 

 of phenomena intervenes. How is it to be controlled? It can only 

 happen in that psychology as a psychological mechanism is allied 

 with a functional idea of the time and becomes at once variable. And 

 this functional idea historical science must supply. Through this it 

 grows to be an evolutionistic psychology fully suited to the actual 

 course of things and as such the basis of mental sciences, both 

 theoretical and applied. 



Is not the relation of the historical to natural science determined 

 by the last few remarks, even if these are only general propositions? 

 I think so, if one does not indeed include physics and chemistry in 



