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Seeley's theory would have considerable justification. History, in 

 such a sense, would have very little worth or meaning beyond its 

 use as supplying material for the inductions of political science, the 

 importance of which I should be the last to dispute. But if the 

 political sequence is grasped as only one part of the larger develop- 

 ment which constitutes history in the fuller sense, then it is clear 

 that the study of political history has its sufficient title and justifica- 

 tion by virtue of its relation to that larger development which 

 includes it, and that it is not merely the handmaid of political 

 science. Political science depends upon its data, and, in return, 

 illuminates it; but does not confer its title-deeds. 



But a larger and more formidable wave, threatening the liberty 

 of history, has still to be encountered. It may be argued that the 

 relation of dependence holds good, though it must be stated in a 

 different and more scientific form. It may be said : Political science 

 is a branch of social science, just as political history is a part of 

 general history; and the object of studying general history is simply 

 and solely to collect and furnish material for sociological science. 

 Thus the former theory reappears, subsumed under a higher prin- 

 ciple. The study of history generally is subordinate to sociology; 

 and it follows that the study of political history especially is sub- 

 ordinate to that branch of sociology which we call political science. 

 The difference, and it is a very important difference, is that, on this 

 theory, political history is no longer isolated; its relations of coor- 

 dination and interdependence with the other sides of social develop- 

 ment would be recognized and emphasized. But the study of general 

 history, including political, would be dependent on, and ancillary 

 to, a study ulterior to itself. 



Now this theory seems to run counter to an axiom which has been 

 frequently enunciated and accepted as self-evident in recent times, 

 namely, that history should be studied for its own sake. It is one 

 of the remarkable ideas which first emerged explicitly into con- 

 sciousness in the last century that the unique series of the phenomena 

 of human development is worthy to be studied for itself, without 

 any ulterior purpose, without any obligation to serve ethical or 

 theological, or any practical ends. This principle of "history for its 

 own sake" might be described as the motto or watchword of the 

 great movement of historical research which has gone on increasing 

 in volume and power since the beginning of the last century. But 

 has this principle a theoretical justification, or is it only an expedient 

 but indefensible fiction instinctively adopted? Is the postulate of 

 "history for its own sake" simply a regulative idea which we find it 

 convenient to accept because experience teaches us that independence 

 is the only basis on which any study can be pursued satisfactorily and 

 scientifically; and while we accord history this status, for reasons 



