ROMAN LAW HISTORICAL SCIENCES 309 



V 



The history of Roman law is clearly connected with that of Lit- 

 erature, yet it can scarcely be shown that either has had much share 

 in actually moulding the other. It can of course be maintained that 

 the high development of Roman law and the fascination which it 

 exercised on the best Roman intellect during the zenith of the 

 Empire are mainly accountable for the differences between Greek 

 and Roman literature, particularly for the poverty of the latter in 

 philosophical writings. But except for that general effect the relation 

 between law and literature at Rome is on the whole one of inter- 

 penetration, rather than of direct action and reaction. We can 

 interpret each by the help of the other, but we cannot, at least in 

 secular literature, establish any filiation between them. The tech- 

 nical phrases used by Horace or Juvenal bring out the legal element 

 in literature, just as the polished style of Labeo or Gaius illustrates 

 the literary element in law. But Horace cannot be connected with 

 the controversies of the Sabinian and Proculian Schools, nor can we 

 trace Juvenal's remark, Res fisci est, ubicunque natat, 1 to the inspir- 

 ation of any particular jurist. No literature can be fundamentally 

 understood without understanding the laws of the country that 

 produced it, and this is particularly true of Rome, because law was 

 her chief intellectual pursuit. On the other hand, the writings of 

 the Roman jurisconsults, being couched in a style of extraordinary 

 elegance and precision, are not only entitled to claim that literary 

 taste is requisite for their appreciation; they represent in them- 

 selves a distinct branch of literature, a branch in which they have 

 probably never been excelled. 



The fact that law and literature can be interwoven is proved in 

 Aristophanes arid the Attic orators, as well as in many more modern 

 instances, but no better examples can be found than in Latin literature. 

 Several of Cicero's orations would be hopelessly puzzling if it were 

 not for our knowledge of Roman law, just as the Fasti of Ovid 

 would be full of difficulty unless we knew something about Roman 

 religion. The same may be said of many passages in the plays of 

 Terence and particularly of Plautus. Volumes have been written, 

 especially in recent years, to explain how the law serves to elucidate 

 those passages, and how they serve even to better purpose in elucidat- 

 ing the law. For just as the Fasti throw more light on Roman religion 

 and topography than we receive from the historians of Ovid's age, 

 so it is certain that we derive more knowledge of the early history 

 of Roman law from information incidentally conveyed by literary 

 men like Livy, Cicero, and Plautus than we do from facts intentionally 

 imparted by scholars like Varro. For any acquaintance with early 

 law Latin literature is indeed indispensable. And in later times, as 



1 Sat. 4, 55. 



