FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS AND METHODS 445 



distinguishing between the normal and the abnormal, and teaches 

 him to measure the value of religion by its relatively sound and 

 properly developed products, rather than by unhealthy, immature, 

 and arrested religious growths. In so far as philosophical theology 

 seeks for the cause of religion outside of man in the constitution of 

 the universe, it becomes a part of ontology or identical with this 

 branch of philosophy. This is obviously the case, whether the his- 

 toric formulae of theology are preserved or the philosophical termino- 

 logy is adopted. 



It is with the history of religion that we are at the present time 

 immediately concerned. At the threshold we are met by two ques- 

 tions requiring attention. Is history a science? and What is religion? 

 If history is not a science, the history of religion is not. Science, no 

 doubt, may be so defined as to exclude the work of the historian. 

 If it is maintained that only absolutely certain and perfectly sys- 

 tematized knowledge is worthy of the name, it can at most apply to 

 the so-called formal sciences, which in reality deal exclusively with 

 objects of thought created by the human mind itself. It would be 

 inexpedient, however, to limit the term science to mathematics 

 and logic. Astronomy, physics, and chemistry, though dealing with 

 objective facts, which can never be adequately known, are universally 

 granted to be sciences, not merely because they depend upon mathe- 

 matics and to a certain extent share its solidity, but also because 

 they attain a high degree of certainty permitting even prediction of 

 facts still in the future. Yet there is a considerable margin of un- 

 certainty in these sciences. The more complex the object of study 

 is, the wider is this margin. There is less possibility of prediction in 

 geology than in astronomy, less in biology than in botany, without 

 prejudice to the scientific character of the study dealing with the 

 more complex organizations. Zoology will undoubtedly retain its 

 place among the sciences, even though it may never learn to predict 

 with accuracy the behavior of an animal under given circumstances 

 in the future. Mentality and volition in the objects studied increase 

 the difficulties of the scientific work and confine the element of 

 prediction within narrower limits, but do not render the study 

 unscientific. 



As these qualities have reached their highest development known 

 to us in man, and the evolution of man's life is determined by the 

 unfolding of his intelligence and will, it is natural that in this field 

 the facts are less completely mastered, the laws of development 

 less clearly perceived, and the future less accurately foretold than 

 in the case of other objects of knowledge. There seems indeed to be 

 little probability that the innumerable facts and factors of human 

 history will ever be known, or that the varied tendencies of human 

 life, affected as they are by the changing external environment, 



