78 SEMITIC LANGUAGE 



that the prevalence of names compounded with the generic name 

 Ilu, god, points back to an earlier monotheism. Characteristic of the 

 reasoning of this book, however, is another statement. In dealing 

 with a certain type of name of the period of Hammurabi, he points 

 out that the most of them are compounded with the names Sin, 

 Shamash, and Ramman, and, as in the case of the Minsean, the gen- 

 eric Ilu. Hethen continues, "Notwithstanding the countless greater 

 and lesser deities in which Babylonian polytheism abounded, the names 

 in general use seem to prove that it was only the moon, sun, and sky 

 which conveyed an impression of deity to the Babylonian mind" 

 (in this point he supports the idea of an original astral worship) ; " but 

 then/' he adds further, "if we substitute the simple word god, Ilu, 

 for the moon, the sun, or the sky, these names express no sentiment 

 which is inconsistent with the highest and purest monotheism." 

 This is much like saying, that, if we were to substitute for Fritz 

 Hommel the title Kaiser, he might pass for the Emperor of Germany. 

 I modestly own my inability to perform the syllogistic feats implied 

 in this mental process. 



The more spiritual view which came in with the ethical monotheism 

 of the prophets is a development from the cruder stage of polytheistic 

 belief. "That was not first which was spiritual, but that which was 

 natural, and afterward that which was spiritual." 



But granted that this result is achieved, some may say it is a nega- 

 tion and, therefore, nugatory? It is a negation, a negation of a 

 widespread doctrine pertaining to man's knowledge of God. But 

 every negation establishes an affirmative as its opposite, and a nega- 

 tive conclusion may determine my action as forcibly as an affirmative. 

 If I establish the fact that there is no more gold to be found in yonder 

 mountain ledge, I will cease to dig there for gold. Action, as we have 

 seen, is motivated by feeling, and feeling issues out of knowledge. If 

 we find that there is no evidence of a primitive revelation of one 

 God from the one God, we have cleared the field for the inquiry, how 

 did man arrive at the idea of God? and our answer to this must, in 

 the nature of things, affect our religion. 



Another question may now arise: assuming the existence of deity, 

 or first cause, or, perhaps better, constant cause (we are not here 

 concerned about the name), how is knowledge of this deity and his 

 will ascertained? The study of Semitics is, I think, in many quarters 

 at least, leading to different conclusions on this point. The Jewish 

 and the Christian doctrine especially have made this knowledge 

 wholly a matter of direct revelation, received in ecstasy, or otherwise. 

 Philo, the Alexandrian Jewish philosopher, taught that God's word 

 was obtained directly from God while the prophet was in a state of 

 ecstasy. Philo, who was widely read in classical literature, borrowed 

 his theory from Plato. The Egyptian priests taught the same. Abam- 



