194 LATIN LANGUAGE 



and Modality. Each of these categories is again divided into three. 

 We are concerned to-day only with the use made of the categories of 

 Modality. The sub-categories of this are: Existence, Possibility, and 

 Necessity. Every recognition or conception of an act or state pos- 

 sible to the human mind must fall under one of these three categories. 

 These three conceptions, native to the mind, are the frames, so to 

 speak, through which the mind looks at whatever occurs in the 

 external world. 



Eleven years after the publication of the Critique, namely in 1792, 

 J. G. Hasse, a schoolmaster in Kant's own town of Konigsberg, 

 published a Grammatology of Greek and Latin, for academic instruc- 

 tion and the upper classes Gymnasien. In his general treatment, he 

 adapted Kant's scheme to grammar, the moods being made to express 

 Existence, Possibility, and Necessity. In the details of his treatment, 

 however, strangely enough, Hasse did not apply these conceptions. 



Nine years later, in 1801, Professor Gottfried Hermann of Leipzig 

 published a book on the reform of the theory of Greek grammar, 

 De emendanda ratione grammaticae Graecae. He upbraids Hasse, in the 

 most general terms, for having misunderstood Kant. As for himself, 

 he says that he shall hold himself free from taking sides in meta- 

 physics, but that he shall avail himself of the categories of Kant. 

 This is precisely what Hasse had done; and, so far as the verb is 

 concerned, the adaptation made by Hermann is the same as the 

 adaptation made by Hasse. On the whole, Hasse seems to have 

 been the saner and better grammarian. He is to-day, however, 

 almost forgotten, 1 while Hermann, dogmatic, severe, strenuous, and 

 triumphant, fills a great place in the history of classical studies. 



The moods, says Hermann, indicate whether the act referred to 

 actually takes place, or can take place, or must take place (the three 

 categories of Existence, Possibility, and Necessity). The first idea is 

 expressed by the Indicative. For the second, the subtile observation 

 of the Greeks recognized two conceptions of Possibility, namely, 

 Objective Possibility (possibilitas obiectiva), and Subjective Pos- 

 sibility (possibilitas subiectiva). The introduction of the terms 

 "Subjective" and "Objective," which played so large a part in 

 philosophy, will be noticed. These two conceptions are expressed by 

 two distinct moods, the Subjunctive and the Optative. The Sub- 

 junctive mood, or the mood of Objectivity, expresses that which in the 

 nature of the case in the given instance is capable of taking place. 

 The Optative mood, or the mood of Subjectivity, expresses that which 

 is capable of being thought. The third modal force, that of Necessity, 

 is expressed by the Imperative if the Necessity is Subjective, by the 

 verbal adjective TTCOS if Objective. 



1 Basse's name is not even mentioned in either of the two well-known lexicons 

 by P6kel and Eckstein. 



