486 SCIENCES OF THE EARTH 



Let this set of assumptions be tried as a working hypothesis. If 

 investigation be possible under it, let such investigation cover the 

 whole ground of what we call truth and error. Let a distinction be 

 drawn between absolutely predetermined mental actions correspond- 

 ing to truthfulness on the one hand, and falsity on the other, if this 

 be possible, and out of the former let science be constructed and let 

 it be shown why it is science, and let the latter be disposed of in some 

 suitable way. In other words, let the doctrine of determinism be 

 piU into workable form, and carried into effect in all its applications, 

 with every step true to the primary assumptions. If this can be 

 done successfully, we shall have a wholly new working basis for the 

 production of science, with new criteria of science. If it cannot be 

 done, and the hypothesis of determinism is unworkable, let it be 

 cast aside like any other unworkable hypothesis. Whatever meta- 

 physicians may think of an unworkable scheme, scientific investi- 

 gators may as well send it to the junk-shop. 



Huxley once delivered himself of an able exposition of determin- 

 ism. It was severely criticised by a fellow countryman who seemed 

 to Huxley to have dealt with him unjustly, and he poured out the 

 vials of his rhetorical wrath upon his critic as only Huxley could. But 

 if determinism be true, I do not see how Huxley's critic could have 

 swerved by a turn of a phrase from what he wrote, and Huxley's 

 wrath was not more consistent than that assigned to Xerxes when 

 he lashed the stormy Hellespont because it thwarted his purpose. 

 But in this I may be wholly wrong. Let determinism prove itself by 

 giving rise to a complete and systematic working hypothesis. 



Whether this can be done or not, let any other basal assumptions 

 suggested by the inquiry be made the ground of like attempts and 

 be developed into full working hypotheses, if possible, and so con- 

 tinue the effort until the whole field is covered. Let it be seen what 

 can and what cannot be put into the form of a working system. 



In this second illustration of the method of regenerative hypo- 

 theses, I have touched questions not usually thought to belong to the 

 earth-sciences. It is none the less true that they are basal to the 

 earth-sciences, as they are to all science, and to all true philosophy 

 as well. The earth-sciences are entitled to probe for their own bot- 

 tom as well as other sciences, or any philosophy, and it is altogether 

 wholesome that they should do so. The most serious source of error 

 in the development of the earth-sciences, in my judgment, is our 

 relative neglect to probe fundamental conceptions and to recognize 

 the extent to which they influence the most common observations 

 and interpretations. We need a method of thought that shall keep us 

 alive to these basal considerations. To this end I believe it to be 

 conducive to soundness of intellectual procedure to regard our whole 

 system of interpretation as but an effort to develop a consistent 



