﻿The 
  BlacivWell 
  Litigation. 
  51 
  

  

  courts, 
  he 
  applied 
  for 
  and 
  obtained 
  an 
  order 
  restraining 
  

   Armistead 
  from 
  the 
  use 
  of 
  the 
  brand. 
  In 
  due 
  course 
  of 
  time 
  

   the 
  matter 
  came 
  on 
  to 
  be 
  heard, 
  and 
  attention 
  is 
  invited 
  to 
  

   the 
  opinion 
  of 
  one 
  of 
  Virginia's 
  most 
  worthy 
  sous 
  and 
  tal- 
  

   ented 
  jurists, 
  the 
  most 
  casual 
  digest 
  of 
  which 
  will 
  show 
  how 
  

   unconditionally 
  the 
  court 
  surrendered 
  the 
  brand 
  to 
  Blackwell, 
  

   and 
  ordered 
  Armistead 
  to 
  reimburse 
  him. 
  Armistead, 
  

   smarting 
  under 
  the 
  blow, 
  hoped 
  by 
  dropping 
  the 
  Bull, 
  to 
  

   register 
  the 
  words 
  "Durham 
  Smoking 
  Tobacco" 
  as 
  a 
  trade- 
  

   mark. 
  He 
  appears 
  before 
  the 
  patent 
  office, 
  and 
  under 
  the 
  

   solemnity 
  of 
  an 
  oath, 
  claims 
  the 
  exclusive 
  use 
  to 
  the 
  word 
  " 
  Dur- 
  

   ham 
  " 
  as 
  a 
  brand. 
  Here 
  again 
  Blackwell 
  meets 
  him. 
  It 
  is 
  

   found 
  that 
  Blackwell 
  has 
  not 
  only 
  protected 
  his 
  brand 
  by 
  a 
  

   trade-mark 
  on 
  the 
  words 
  with 
  the 
  Bull, 
  but 
  has 
  actually 
  ob- 
  

   tained 
  a 
  trade-mark 
  on 
  the 
  words 
  independent 
  of 
  the 
  Bull. 
  

   The 
  last 
  trade-mark 
  Armistead 
  swears 
  is 
  spurious, 
  and 
  asks 
  

   an 
  interference. 
  The 
  Commissioner 
  says, 
  that 
  while 
  the 
  

   office 
  erred 
  in 
  granting 
  Blackwell 
  his 
  last 
  trade-mark, 
  it 
  

   cannot 
  repeat 
  the 
  error 
  in 
  order 
  that 
  Armistead 
  may 
  be 
  

   placed 
  upon 
  the 
  same 
  footing. 
  He 
  therefore 
  dismisses 
  the 
  

   interference, 
  refuses 
  Armistead 
  the 
  right 
  to 
  register, 
  and 
  

   thus 
  leaves 
  Blackwell 
  with 
  two 
  trademarks. 
  

  

  The 
  following 
  is 
  the 
  opinion 
  of 
  the 
  Court: 
  

  

  KiVES, 
  J. 
  — 
  Tlie 
  preliminary 
  injunction 
  in 
  this 
  case 
  was 
  

   founded 
  on 
  the 
  statements 
  of 
  the 
  bill. 
  In 
  pursuance 
  of 
  the 
  

   notice 
  required 
  by 
  statute, 
  the 
  defendant 
  appeared 
  and 
  con- 
  

   tested 
  its 
  emanation 
  upon 
  ex 
  parte 
  affidavits 
  assailing 
  the 
  

   title 
  of 
  the 
  plaintiffs. 
  But 
  in 
  that 
  incipient 
  state 
  of 
  the 
  pro- 
  

   ceedings 
  it 
  would 
  not 
  have 
  been 
  proper, 
  if 
  at 
  all 
  practicable, 
  

   to 
  pass 
  upon 
  the 
  merits 
  of 
  this 
  defense; 
  and 
  the 
  only 
  ques- 
  

   tion 
  then 
  was, 
  whether 
  the 
  case, 
  as 
  presented 
  by 
  the 
  bill 
  

   and 
  affected 
  by 
  this 
  adverse 
  testimony, 
  was 
  still 
  such 
  as 
  to 
  

   require 
  this 
  day 
  till 
  the 
  merits 
  of 
  the 
  controversy 
  could 
  be 
  

   developed 
  by 
  further 
  pleading 
  and 
  testimony. 
  The 
  pro- 
  

   priety 
  of 
  this 
  interposition 
  by 
  the 
  court 
  will 
  scarcely 
  be 
  now 
  

   questioned, 
  as 
  these 
  further 
  proceedings 
  have 
  shown 
  the 
  

   case 
  to 
  be 
  one 
  of 
  perplexity 
  and 
  doubt. 
  

  

  The 
  pleadings 
  have 
  now 
  been 
  perfected. 
  The 
  defendant's 
  

   answer 
  was 
  duly 
  filed, 
  issue 
  taken 
  upon 
  it, 
  and 
  the 
  cause 
  

   set 
  down 
  for 
  final 
  hearing. 
  A 
  vast 
  volume 
  of 
  testimony 
  has 
  

   also 
  been 
  taken, 
  some 
  of 
  it 
  contradictory, 
  and 
  a 
  vast 
  deal 
  

   of 
  it 
  irrelevant 
  and 
  impertinent. 
  It 
  is 
  to 
  be 
  regretted 
  that 
  

   the 
  zeal 
  of 
  counsel 
  or 
  the 
  anxiety 
  of 
  parties 
  should 
  have 
  so 
  

  

  