82 BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF HUMAN PROBLEMS 



state; without the sense of freedom, the construc- 

 tive ideas of a race are nipped in the bud, and never 

 reach the stage of achievement. We see this 

 paralysis of action in just those nations which are 

 most dominated by ideas of fatalism. 



But the conviction of the reality of freedom of the 

 will which is based on a consciousness of this freedom 

 cannot so easily be brushed aside. If we are not, 

 in reality, free agents, how does it happen that we 

 feel ourselves to be such? I think the mechanistic 

 conception of life furnishes us with at least a partial 

 answer, based on the view that the sensation of will 

 is a symbol accompanying or following certain 

 physical processes in the brain which give rise to 

 feelings or acts. According to this view, the sensa- 

 tion of willing is never primary or spontaneous, but 

 always marks a reaction of the nervous system to 

 some impulse or group of impulses originating 

 ultimately outside the body. 



Let us suppose that I enter a bookseller's shop with 

 the intention of buying an edition of Browning's 

 poems. The bookseller places before me two edi- 

 tions, alike in all respects except in the color of the 

 binding, which in one set is red, in the other blue. 

 I consider the two colors for a time, and, after a few 

 moments of hesitancy, decide on the red-colored 

 edition. In making this selection, I have not the 

 slightest doubt as to my freedom to choose between 

 the red and the blue unless, indeed, I pause to 

 think about the underlying history of my choice. 



