176 MORAL SENSE 



There is not one of these moral qualities that is not 

 possessed, sometimes in a high degree, by certain of the 

 lower animals, and more especially the dog ; and there are 

 many authors, who have been desirous of drawing marked 

 psychical distinctions between man and other animals, who 

 have nevertheless felt themselves compelled by the evidence 

 of facts to concede to these other animals, or certain of them, 

 the possession of morality akin to that of man. Agassiz, for 

 instance, grants them morals ; Froude speaks of their prin- 

 ciples of morality ; Brodie refers to the moral sentiments as 

 occurring in gregarious animals ; Shaftesbury allows to them 

 a sense and practice of moral rectitude ; Watson gives in- 

 stances of their moral feeling, and Wood of their conscience. 

 And certain animals have even been described as possessing 

 a moral law and codes of morals. 



The dog, at least, frequently exhibits a knowledge of 

 right and wrong, making a deliberate choice of the one or the 

 other, perfectly aware of and prepared for the consequences of 

 such a selection. The animal has occasionally the moral 

 courage to choose the right and to suffer for it, to bear wrong 

 rather than do it (Elam). Not only does this frequently 

 noble animal know the right, but it dares to do it, enduring 

 the expected, the inevitable, consequent, suffering. One of 

 the many evidences that the dog is sensible of right-doing is 

 to be found in the familiar fact that when it performs an 

 action which to it seems meritorious, or which it has reason 

 to believe its master will deem so when it saves a life, or 

 successfully defends a trust, or resists some great temptation 

 it looks at once for some sign of the said master's appro- 

 bation, perhaps for some reward. There is both the self- 

 approbation or self-satisfaction of the mens conscia recti and 

 an expectation of man's approval. The animal is gratified 

 if such approval is in any form vouchsafed, disappointed if it 

 be withheld. 



It must also distinguish between the right and the ex- 

 pedient what would be most for its own interest to do. In 

 other words, it is just as apt as man is, and not more so, 

 to take a selfish view of all affairs to consider how they 

 are likely to affect its own personal interests. The choice 



