CHAPTER XVIII. 



ANIMAL MOTIVES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION BY MAN. 



PIERQUIN, Montaigne, and other authors have pointed out, 

 and dwelt upon, the fallacies connected with man's interpre- 

 tation of the feelings, ideas, or thoughts of other animals ; 

 they have shown the fallibility of man's inferences, when he 

 endeavours to form a judgment regarding their motives or 

 causes of action their reasons, inducements, or impulses. 

 We are constantly reminded that we do not know and that 

 there is no possibility of our knowing what are, for 

 instance, the impressions or ideas of the outer world formed 

 by animals. 



We can only infer that similar actions in other animals 

 are determined by similar motives to those which actuate 

 man. It is only by the comparison of our own actions, in 

 relation to our own motives, that we can infer what are the 

 motives of other animals when they perform similar actions, 

 or are placed in the same kind of circumstances. But man's 

 inference may be wrong in what is essentially the attribution 

 of human motives to the lower animals ; similar actions in 

 other animals may be attributable to causes or motives that 

 are really dissimilar ; in short, the processes of feeling and 

 reasoning in other animals may not be the same as in man. 

 But, it appears to me, that a bugbear is made of this 

 theoretical objection, which is one of the arguments adduced 

 in support of the opinion of those who deny that there is 

 any community of character between the ' reason ' of man 

 and the ' instinct ' of the lower animal. Precisely the same 

 line of argument might be adopted in regard to man him- 

 self; it might be fitly applied to the comparison of the 



