MIND IS FUNCTION 185 



cies of their brains, and the necessities of their think- 

 ing, in the class to which they belong. But ''sym- 

 pathy" is not as plausible an hypothesis as that of orig- 

 inal use of his (the Ammophila's) sting until he found 

 the correct places, and in course of time, the habit 

 became hereditary, as an instinct. Bergson admits 

 that science treats instincts as at first intelligent action, 

 afterwards reduced to automatism, and could not treat 

 them in any other view, but that science seems to ex- 

 pect philosophy to adopt another view, viz., from the 

 inside of life itself, and make everything connected 

 with life an impetus from within. That is transcen- 

 dentalism, and gives greater importance to intuition 

 than to induction. The philosophy that ignores, or 

 goes beyond, the induction of science, has none of the 

 sensory evidence, that is the criterion of truth. 



Bergson again says: "Instinct is sympathy. If this 

 sympathy could extend its object and also reflect upon 

 itself, it would give us the key to vital operations, 

 just as intelligence, developed and disciplined, guides 

 us into matter." It is more likely that instinct is ex- 

 perience become automatic by very long usage, and 

 that it is limited by that origin to just what it does 

 that it is altogether incapable of more than the primi- 

 tive service it now makes to the support of life. In- 

 telligence, also, is limited to the fabrications of 

 matter, in the support of life, and the enlarging of 

 life 's functions. Neither it, nor instinct, will ever give 

 us the true key to life processes, or rather to the origin 

 and meaning of life. Science, which is the highest 

 form of intelligence, will greatly extend its achieve- 

 ments, but not behind phenomena, except to implant 

 in our brains certain inferences that will be of no 

 practical benefit. 



