210 UNIVERSAL EVOLUTION 



the evolutionist, and the natural philosopher, have 

 seized upon the motions of matter in its apparent 

 changes, from the exterior, of course, because the intel- 

 lect could not penetrate to the center, and work as life 

 does, towards the circumference. It was compelled to 

 reverse the evident method of nature, entirely, on ac- 

 count of the limitations of the intellect. Now if 

 Bergson. can, with intuition, give the world a better 

 system of philosophy than, so far, the scientists of the 

 Darwinian school have given, who can object? He has 

 given an intimation only of such in "Creative Evolu- 

 tion," but nothing like a philosophical system. It seems 

 that it may be far beyond mechanism, and short of 

 finality, in that a personal creator, and controller is 

 not expected to be reached. 



Bergson says that intuition is an enlarged instinct. 

 Of course instinct is an inherited single choice of doing 

 things, and is usually defined as a special innate pro- 

 pensity, which transcends the experience of the organ- 

 ism. This is also what intuition is. But intuition is 

 usually attributed to human beings, and instinct to 

 animals, as well as to the human being. If the intui- 

 tion which Bergson calls an enlarged instinct, and 

 which he also thinks grows out of intellect, shall be 

 able to solve the enigma of origin, and vital impetus, 

 he will have to revise his definitions, one or both. In- 

 tellect comes by experience, and if intuition grows out 

 of that, how can it be an enlarged instinct, which he 

 claims does not grow out of experience. He says in- 

 stinct and intellect are different in kind. There is a 

 paradox in his views upon these qualities of the brain. 



THE EGO. Man is a product of evolution and a 

 differentiated form of natural phenomena. Therefore 

 it is best to view him in his bodily form, and consider 



