1 82 SPECULATIVE SCIENCE 



of this proposition, contenting himself with showing, first, that 

 no tangible thing but matter exists a mere begging the ques- 

 tion ; and, secondly, that properties and accidents are not 

 entities distinct from matter which is true, but little to the 

 point. As examples of properties he gives weight, heat, fluidity ; 

 as examples of accidents, poverty, riches, liberty, &c. Time, he 

 says, exists not by itself, but simply from the things which 

 happen ; actions do not exist by themselves, but may be fairly 

 called accidents of matter, and of the space in which they seve- 

 rally go on. Even if all this be granted, we shall not necessarily 

 concede that matter and void have alone a separate existence ; 

 but we must not complain that Lucretius does not support his 

 proposition more strongly at this point, for indeed his six books 

 form one long argument in support of his proposition. Lucretius 

 undertakes to show that every fact in the world can be explained 

 by the properties of matter, and that matter itself may be con- 

 ceived as possessed of but a very few simple properties, from the 

 construction of which the complex facts we see may follow. Of 

 course, he fails to do this ; but if the proposition be restricted 

 to what are called physical phenomena, it becomes, if not 

 certainly true, nevertheless an hypothesis well worthy of con- 

 sideration, and not yet proved false. Lucretius admits no 

 subtle ethers, no variety of elements with fiery, watery, light, 

 heavy principles ; he does not suppose light to be one thing, 

 fire another electricity a fluid, magnetism a vital principle but 

 treats all phenomena as mere properties or accidents of simple 

 matter, and produced in simple ways ; but to understand what 

 he meant by matter, or ' bodies,' we must pass on. 



The next proposition of Lucretius describes the composition 

 of matter as we perceive it. Bodies are either atoms, or com- 

 pounded of atoms and void, or, more at length, they ' are partly 

 first beginnings of things, partly those which are formed of a 

 union of first beginnings.' The words which Mr. Munro here 

 translates as ' first beginnings of things ' describe the Lucretian 

 atoms ; Lucretius does not use the word atoms, but calls these 

 ( primordia,' or c semina rerum.' These atoms are necessarily 

 solid, or they could not mark off void space from full. They 

 cannot be broken, because they have no void within them to 

 admit a cutting body, or wet, or cold, or fire, therefore they 



