INSTINCT. 303 



of any moral, intellectual, or scientific conscious 

 powers, and are therefore merely natural agents of a 

 secondary class in which such powers are exhibited*." 



Dr. Hancock, who, about ten years ago, published 

 a volume on Instinct, takes nearly the same view as 

 Mr. O. French. ' k On survey ing, 5 ' he says, " the 

 actions of men and brutes, there seem to be sufficient 

 logical grounds for making two grand distinctions ; 

 the one comprising those actions which appear to be 

 done blindly or without premeditation and without 

 experience; and the other, those which are done with 

 forethought, by combining means to accomplish ends, 

 which are often the result of individual or social 

 experience and instruction. 



" These general facts seem to be so obvious, that 

 they lead us at once to call them by different names, 

 and to conclude that they arise from different pro- 

 pensities or faculties ; and the words Instinct and 

 Reason come up as nearly to the view of the case as 

 any others we could employ. Hence, while reason 

 acts with intelligence and design (variably, indeed, 

 and inconstantly), profiting by experience, comparing 

 motives, balancing probabilities, looking forward to 

 the future, and adapting itself to every change of 

 circumstance, instinct operates with uniformity in all 

 individuals of the same species, and performs its office 

 with unerring certainty, prior to all experience. 



" It is proper for me here to remark that the word 

 reason is used in senses which are extremely different; 

 sometimes to express the whole of these powers which 

 elevate man above the brutes, and constitute what is 

 called his rational nature, more especially perhaps 

 his intellectual powers, and sometimes to express the 

 power of deduction or argumentation. The former is 

 the sense in which the word is used in common dis- 

 course. It is in the latter restricted sense, as indeed 

 * Zoolog, Journ. i, 12, 



