36 New Hampshire Experiment Station [Bulletin 332 



This price comparison is shown in figure 13 which shows the dif- 

 ferential of Berlin prices over Boston prices and the percentage of pro- 

 ducers in the Jefferson area selling to Berlin. From December, 1936, two 

 scries are given for Boston, representing the prices received (after deduc- 

 tion of dues and transportation) at the farm for milk delivered to each 

 station. 



Except for brief periods, Berlin prices have been consistently above 

 Boston prices, even after taking into consideration the higher transporta- 

 tion charges to plants supphing the former market. For the whole period, 

 a simple average for Berlin is 27.6 cents per cwt. above the price received 

 by producers shipping to one Boston handler and 21.1 cents over that 

 returned by the other Boston handler. This differential is by no means 

 uniform, however, reaching high levels in the period August 1931-June 

 1932 and August 1935-July 1937, and at times dropping to below Boston 

 for periods of several months duration. 



If prices, alone, were considered, and if producers were free to select 

 the market in which to sell, the relationships of the eight years preceding 

 March 1939, might have been expected to result in a wholesale shift of 

 producers away from the Boston, and to the Berlin, market. A sustained 

 advantage in net returns from one market to another, other things being 

 etiual, should influence producers to sell in the market which yields the 

 greater return. 



Factors Other Thmi Price Which hjfluenced Jejferso?i Producers in 

 Their Choice of a Market 



In the corresponding section on Haverhill, a general discussion of 

 the factors other than price which influence producers' choice of market 

 v/as presented. Accordingly, in this section, it is proposed to confine the 

 discussion to the importance of specific factors operating in the Jefferson 

 aiea, and not to repeat the generalized treatment contained in the earlier 

 section. 



The first two factors considered are: (1) that handlers may limit the 

 number of producers or the amount of milk \\hich they will purchase, 

 and (2) that existing contracts may prevent immediate release of pro- 

 ducers from their present sales agencies. 



Both of these obstacles to free producer movement were of impor- 

 tance in Jefferson. Particularly in the latter part of 1935, when Control 

 Board action raised Berlin prices to their highest differential over Boston 

 prices, Berlin dealers, instead of taking on more producers, dropped old 

 shippers and procured a part of their milk in Maine. At other times, often 

 M'hen the Berlin market was most attractive, dealers in that market had all 

 the milk they required and would-be-sellers were unable to enter the 

 market. 



Especially since 1937, when producers organized to build their own 

 cooperative plant in Lancaster, a retarding influence on shifts to the Berlin 

 market have been the contracts ^\ hich ^\ ere made with the cooperative. 

 These contracts obligated the signer to send his milk to the cooperative 

 for a definite period of years, after which he could make arrangements to 

 sell elsewhere if he so desired. 



