358 FRAGMENTS OF SCIENCE. 



Over tliis argument, from experience, which at bottom 

 is his argument, Mr. Mozley rides roughshod. There is a 

 dash of scorn in the energy with which lie tramples on it. 

 Probably some previous writer had made too much of it, 

 and thus invited his powerful assault. Finding the diffi- 

 culty of belief in miracles to rise from their being in con- 

 tradiction to the order of nature, he sets himself to examine 

 the grounds of our belief in that order. With a vigor of 

 logic rarely equaled, and with a confidence in its con- 

 clusions never surpassed, lie disposes of this belief in a 

 manner calculated to startle those who, without due exam- 

 ination, had come to the conclusion that the order of 

 nature was secure. 



What we mean, he says, by our belief in the order of 

 nature, is the belief that the future will be like the past. 

 There is not, according to Mr. Mozley, the slightest rational 

 basis for this belief. 



" That any cause in nature is more permanent than its existing and 

 known effects, extending further, and about to produce other and 

 more instances besides what it has produced already, we have no 

 evidence. Let us imagine," he continues, " the occurrence of a par- 

 ticular physical phenomenon for the first time. Upon that single 

 occurrence we should have but the very faintest expectation of an- 

 other. If it did occur again, once or twice, so far from counting on 

 another occurrence, a cessation would occur as the most natural event 

 to us. But let it continue one hundred times, and we should find no 

 hesitation in inviting persons from a distance to see it; and if it 

 occurred every day for years, its occurrence would be a certainty to 

 us, its cessation a marvel. . . .What ground of reason can we 

 assign for an expectation that any part of the course of nature will be 

 the next moment what it has been up to this moment, i.e., for our 

 belief in the uniformity of nature? None. No demonstrative reason 

 can be given, for the contrary to the recurrence of a fact of nature is 

 no contradiction. No probable reason can be given; for all probable 

 reasoning respecting the course of nature is founded upon this 

 presumption of likeness, and therefore cannot be the foundation of 

 it. No reason can be given for this belief. It is without a reason. 

 It rests upon no rational grounds and can be traced to no rational 

 principle." 



" Everything," Mr. Mozley, however, adds, " depends 

 upon this belief, every provision we make for the future, 

 every safeguard and caution we employ against it, all cal- 

 culation, all adjustment of means to ends, supposes this 

 belief; and yet this belief has no more producible reason 

 for it than a speculation of fancy. ... It is necessary, 



