652 FRAGMENTS OF SCIENCE. 



sequence, which gives rise to bodily actions? Speaking 

 for myself, it is certain that I have no power of imagining 

 such states interposed between the molecules of the brain, 

 and influencing the transference of motion among the 

 molecules. The thing ' eludes all mental presentation/ 

 Hence an iron strength seems to belong to the logic which 

 claims for the brain an automatic action uninfluenced by 

 consciousness. But it is, I believe, admitted by those who 

 hold the automaton theory, that states of consciousness are 

 produced by the motion of the molecules of the brain; and 

 this production of consciousness by molecular motion is to 

 me quite as unpresentable to the mental vision as the pro- 

 duction of molecular motion by consciousness. If I reject 

 one result I must reject both. /, however, reject neither, 

 and thus stand in the presence of two Incomprehensibles, 

 instead of one Incomprehensible." Here I secede from 

 the automaton theory, though maintained by friends who 

 have all my esteem, and fall back upon the avowal which 

 occurs with such wearisome iteration throughout the fore- 

 going pages; namely, my own utter incapacity to grasp the 

 problem. 



This avowal is repeated with emphasis in the passage to 

 which Professor Virchow's translator draws attention. 

 What, 1 there ask, is the causal connection between the 

 objective and the subjective between molecular motions 

 and states of consciousness? My answer is: I do not see 

 the connection, nor am I acquainted with anybody who 

 does. It is no explanation to say that the objective and 

 subjective are two sides of one and the same phenomenon. 

 Why should the phenomenon have two sides? This is the 

 very core of the difficulty. There are plenty of molecular 

 motions which do not exhibit this two-sidedness. Does 

 water think or feel when it runs into frost-ferns upon a 

 window pane? If not, why should the molecular motion 

 of the brain be yoked to this mysterious companion- 

 consciousness? We can form a coherent picture of all the 

 purely physical processes the stirring of the brain, the 

 thrilling of the nerves, the discharging of the muscles, and 

 all the subsequent motions of the organism. We are here 

 dealing with mechanical problems which are mentally 

 presentable. But we can form no picture of the process 

 whereby consciousness emerges, either as a necessary link, 

 or as an accidental by-product, of this series of actions. 



