34 Life and Matter [chap. h. 



Persistence of the Existent. 



Is there, then, no meaning in the con- 

 ception which Professor Haeckel and others 

 have so enthusiastically formulated, and 

 which certainly commends itself to every 

 one as representing in some sense a genuine 

 truth, whether it be called a "law of 

 substance " or whatever it be called ? There 

 does seem a certain plausibility in the idea, 

 pure guess or assumption though it be, that 

 anything which really and fundamentally 

 exists, in a serious and untrivial and non- 

 accidental sense, can be trusted not suddenly 

 to go out of existence and leave no trace 

 behind. In other words, there seems some 

 reason to suppose 'that anything which 

 actually exists must be in some way or other 

 perpetual ; that real existence is not a 

 capricious and changing attribute : arbitrary 

 collocations and accidental relations may and 

 must be temporary, but there may be in 

 each a fundamental substratum which, if it 

 can be reached, will be found to be eternal. 



