Mind and Matter 101 



beyond those over which his jurisdiction 

 extends. 



First as to the "law of substance," by 

 which he sets so much store ; the fact which 

 he is really, though indistinctly, trying to 

 emphasise, is what I have preferred to 

 formulate as " the persistence of the really 

 existent," see page 34 ; and, with that 

 modification, we can agree with Haeckel, or 

 with what I take to be his inner meaning, to 

 some extent. We may all fairly agree, I 

 think, that whatever really and fundamentally 

 exis ts must, so far as bare existence is 

 concerned, be independent of time. It may 

 go through many changes, and thus have a 

 history ; that is to say, must have definite 

 time-relations, so far as its changes are 

 concerned ; but it can hardly be thought of 

 as either going out of existence, or as 

 coming into existence, at any given period, 

 though it may completely change its form 

 and accidents ; everything basal must have 

 a past and a future of some kind or other, 

 though any special concatenation or arrange- 



