MYSTICISM AND LOGIC n 



world of phantoms from which we are to be liberated by 

 the insight of the vision. Sometimes for example in 

 Hegel, and at least verbally in Spinoza not only evil, 

 but good also, is regarded as illusory, though nevertheless 

 the emotional attitude towards what is held to be Reality 

 is such as would naturally be associated with the belief 

 that Reality is good. What is, in all cases, ethically 

 characteristic of mysticism is absence of indignation or 

 protest, acceptance with joy, disbelief in the ultimate 

 truth of the division into two hostile camps, the good and 

 the bad. This attitude is a direct outcome of the nature 

 of the mystical experience : with its sense of unity is 

 associated a feehng of infinite peace. Indeed it may be 

 suspected that the feeling of peace produces, as feelings 

 do in dreams, the whole system of associated beliefs 

 which make up the body of mystic doctrine. But this is 

 a difficult question, and one on which it cannot be hoped 

 that mankind will reach agreement. 



Four questions thus arise in considering the truth or 

 falsehood of mysticism, namely : 



I. Are there two ways of knowing, which may be called 

 respectively reason and intuition ? And if so, is either to 

 be preferred to the other ? 



II. Is all plurality and division illusory ? 



III. Is time unreal ? 



IV. What kind of reality belongs to good and evil ? 



On all four of these questions, while fully developed 

 mysticism seems to me mistaken, I yet believe that, by 

 sufficient restraint, there is an element of wisdom to be 

 learned from the mystical way of feeling, which does not 

 seem to be attainable in any other manner. If this is the 

 truth, mysticism is to be commended as an attitude 

 towards life, not'as'a creedTaBout'tBe"^^^ Tlie ineta- 



