MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 19 



existing, are mere illusion. The conception of a Reality 

 quite other than the world of appearance, a reality one, 

 indivisible, and unchanging, was introduced into Western 

 philosophy by Parmenides, not, nominally at least, for 

 mystical or religious reasons, but on the basis of a logical 

 argument as to the impossibility of not-being, and most 

 subsequent metaphysical systems are the outcome of 

 this fundamental idea. 



The logic used in defence of mysticism seems to be 

 faulty as logic, and open to technical criticisms, which I 

 have explained elsewhere. I shall not here repeat these 

 criticisms, since they are lengthy and difficult, but shall 

 instead attempt an analysis of the state of mind from 

 which mystical logic has arisen. 



Belief in a reality quite different from what appears to 

 the senses arises with irresistible force in certain moods, 

 which are the source of most mysticism, and of most 

 metaphysics. Wliile such a mood is dominant, the need 

 of logic is not felt, and accordingly the more thorough- 

 going mystics do not employ logic, but appeal directly 

 to the immediate dehverance of their insight. But such 

 fully developed mysticism is rare in the West. Wlien 

 the intensity of emotional conviction subsides, a man 

 who is in the habit of reasoning will search for logical 

 grounds in favour of the belief which he finds in himself. 

 But since the belief already exists, he will be very hos- 

 pitable to any ground that suggests itself. The paradoxes 

 apparently proved by his logic are really the paradoxes 

 of mysticism, and are the goal which he feels his logic 

 must reach if it is to be in accordance with insight. The 

 resulting logic has rendered most philosophers incapable 

 of giving any account of the world of science and daily 

 life. If they had been anxious to give such an account, 

 they would probably have discovered the errors of their 



