MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 25 



physics disappear in this philosophy, because they are 

 too " static " ; what is real is no impulse and movement 

 towards a goal which, like the rainbow, recedes as we 

 advance, and makes every place different when it reaches 

 it from what it appeared to be at a distance. 



I do not propose to enter upon a technical examination 

 of this philosophy. I wish only to maintain that the 

 motives and interests which inspire it are so exclusively 

 practical, and the problems with which it deals are so 

 special, that it can hardly be regarded as touching any 

 of the questions that, to my mind, constitute genuine 

 philosophy. 



The predominant interest of evolutionism is in the 

 question of human destiny, or at least of the destiny of 

 Life. It is more interested in morality and happiness 

 than in knowledge for its own sake. It must be admitted 

 that the same may be said of many other philosophies, 

 and that a desire for the kind of knowledge which philo- 

 sophy can give is very rare. But if philosophy is to 

 attain truth, it is necessary first and foremost that 

 philosophers should acquire the disinterested intellectual 

 curiosity which characterises the genuine man of science. 

 Knowledge concerning the future ^which is the kind of 

 knowledge that must be sought if we are to know about 

 human destiny ^is possible within certain narrow limits. 

 It is impossible to say how much the hmits may be en- 

 larged with the progress of science. But what is evident 

 is that any proposition about the future belongs by its 

 subject-matter to some particular science, and is to be 

 ascertained, if at all, by the methods of that science. 

 Philosophy is not a short cut to the same kind of results as 

 those of the other sciences : if it is to be a genuine study, 

 it must have a provnice of its own, and aim at results 

 which the other sciences can neither prove nor disprove. 



