112 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



to be used. The study of logic consists, broadly speak- 

 ing, of two not very sharply distinguished portions. On 

 the one hand it is concerned with those general state- 

 ments which can be made concerning everything without 

 mentioning any one thing or predicate or relation, such 

 for example as '' if :v is a member of the class a and every 

 member of a is a member of ^ , then ^ is a member of 

 the class /3, whatever x, a, and ^ may be." On the other 

 hand, it is concerned with the analysis and enumeration 

 of logical forms, i.e. with the kinds of propositions that 

 may occur, with the various types of facts, and with the 

 classification of the constituents of facts. In this way 

 logic provides an inventory of possibilities, a repertory 

 of abstractly tenable hypotheses. 



It might be thought that such a study would be too 

 vague and too general to be of any very great importance, 

 and that, if its problems became at any point sufficiently 

 definite, they would be merged in the problems of some 

 special science. It appears, however, that this is not the 

 case. In some problems, for example, the analysis of 

 space and time, the nature of perception, or the theory 

 of judgment, the discovery of the logical form of the 

 facts involved is the hardest part of the work and the 

 part whose performance has been most lacking hitherto. 

 It is chiefly for want of the right logical hypothesis that 

 such problems have hitherto been treated in such an un- 

 satisfactory manner, and have given rise to those con- 

 tradictions or antinomies in which the enemies of reason 

 among philosophers have at all times delighted. 



By concentrating attention upon the investigation of 

 logical forms, it becomes possible at last for philosophy 

 to deal with its problems piecemeal, and to obtain, as 

 the sciences do, such partial and probably not wholly 

 correct results as subsequent investigation can utilise 



