VII 



THE ULTIMATE CONSTITUENTS 

 OF MATTERS 



I WISH to discuss in this article no less a question 

 than the ancient metaphysical query, " What is 

 matter ? " The question, " What is matter ? " in so far 

 as it concerns philosophy, is, I think, already capable of 

 an answer which in principle will be as complete as an 

 answer can hope to be ; that is to say, we can separate 

 the problem into an essentially soluble and an essentially 

 insoluble portion, and we can now see how to solve the 

 essentially soluble portion, at least as regards its main 

 outlines. It is these outlines which I wish to suggest in 

 the present article. My main position, which is realistic, 

 is, I hope and believe, not remote from that of Professor 

 Alexander, by whose writings on this subject I have profited 

 greatly. 2 It is also in close accord with that of Dr. Nunn.^ 

 Common sense is accustomed to the division of the 

 world into mind and matter. It is supposed by all who 

 have never studied philosophy that the distinction be- 

 tween mind and matter is perfectly clear and easy, that 

 the two do not at any point overlap, and that only a fool 

 or a philosopher could be in doubt as to whether any 

 given entity is mental or material. This simple faith 



^ An address delivered to the Philosophical Society of Manchester 

 in February, 1915. Reprinted from The Monist, July, 1915. 



* Cf. especially Samuel Alexander, " The Basis of Realism," British 

 Academy, Vol. VI. 



^ " Are Secondary Qualities Independent of Perception ? " Proc. 

 Arist. Soc, 1909-10, pp. 191-218. 



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