176 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



question whether Homer existed ; but here " Homer ** 

 means " the author of the Homeric poems/* and is a 

 description. Similarly we may ask whether God exists ; 

 but then " God *' means " the Supreme Being " or " the 

 ens realissimum " or whatever other description we may 

 prefer. If " God " were a proper name, God would have 

 to be a datum ; and then no question could arise as to 

 His existence. The distinction between existence and 

 other predicates, which Kant obscurely felt, is brought 

 to light by the theory of descriptions, and is seen to 

 remove " existence " altogether from the fundamental 

 notions of metaphysics. 



What has been said about " existence " applies equally 

 to " reality," which may, in fact, be taken as synonymous 

 with '' existence." Concerning the immediate objects in 

 illusions, hallucinations, and dreams, it is meaningless to 

 ask whether they *' exist " or are " real." There they are, 

 and that ends the matter. But we may legitimately 

 inquire as to the existence or reality of '* things " or other 

 " sensibilia " inferred from such objects. It is the un- 

 reality of these " things " and other " sensibilia," together 

 with a failure to notice that they are not data, which has 

 led to the view that the objects of dreams are unreal. 



We may now apply these considerations in detail to the 

 stock arguments against reahsm, though what is to be said 

 will be mainly a repetition of what others have said before. 



(i) We have first the variety of normal appearances, 

 supposed to be incompatible. This is the case of the 

 difierent shapes and colours which a given thing presents 

 to difierent spectators. Locke's water which seems both 

 hot and cold belongs to this class of cases. Our system 

 of different perspectives fully accounts for these cases, 

 and shows that they afford no argument against realism. 



(2) We* have cases where the correlation between 



