i86 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



appeared after the conditions a, b, c, d, and after these 

 conditions only, will not fail to recur as soon as the same 

 conditions are again present."^ \ 



A great part of Bergson's attack on science rests on the 

 assumption that it employs this principle. In fact, it 

 employs no such principle, but philosophers even 

 Bergson ^are too apt to take their views on science from 

 each other, not from science. As to what the principle 

 is, there is a fair consensus among philosophers of different 

 schools. There are, however, a number of difficulties 

 which at once arise. '^I omit the question of plurality of 

 causes for the present, since other graver questions have 

 to be considered. ) Two^of theses, which are forced on our 

 attention by the above statement of the law, are the 

 following : : 



I (i) Wliat is meant by an " event " ? 

 \ (2) How long may the time-interval be between cause 

 and effect ? 



(i)^An "event,'* in the statement of the law, is ob- 

 viously intended to be something that is likely to recur, 

 since otherwise the law becomes trivial. It follows that 

 an "event " is not a particular, but some universal of 

 which there may be many instances. It follows also that 

 an " event " must be something short of the whole state 

 of the universe, since it is highly improbable that this will 

 recur. Wliat is meant by an " event " is something like 

 striking a match, or dropping a penny into the slot of an 

 automatic machine. If such an event is to recur, it must 

 not be defined too narrowly : we must not state with 

 what degree of force the match is to be struck, nor what 

 is to be the temperature of the penny. For if such con- 

 siderations were relevant, our "event " would occur at 



* Time and Free Wilt, p. 202. 



