192 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



may say that a volition *' operates " when tliere is some 

 law in virtue of which a similar volition in rather similar 

 circumstances will usually be followed by what it wills. 

 But this is a vague conception, and introduces ideas 

 which we have not yet considered. What is chiefly im- 

 portant to notice is that the usual notion of *' operating " 

 is not open to us if we reject, as I contend that we should, 

 the usual notion of causation. 



(5) /* A cause cannot operate except where it is/* This 

 maxim is very widespread ; it was urged against Newton, 

 and has remained a source of prejudice against " action at 

 a distance." In philosophy it has led to a denial of 

 transient action, and thence to monism or Leibnizian 

 monadism. Like the analogous maxim concerning tem- 

 poral contiguity, it rests upon the assumption that causes 

 " operate," i.e. that they are in some obscure way 

 analogous to volitions. And, as in the case of temporal 

 contiguity, the inferences drawn from this maxim are 

 wholly groundless. 



I return now to the question, What law or laws 

 can be found to take the place of the supposed law of 

 causality ? 



First, without passing beyond such uniformities of 

 sequence as are contemplated by the traditional law, we 

 may admit that, if any such sequence has been observed 

 in a great many cases, and has never been found to fail, 

 there is an inductive probability that it will be found to 

 hold in future cases. If stones have hitherto been found 

 to break windows, it is probable that they will continue 

 to do so. This, of course, assumes the inductive principle, 

 of which the truth may reasonably be questioned ; but 

 as this principle is not our present concern, I shall in this 

 discussion treat it as indubitable. We may then say, in 

 the case of any such frequently observed sequence, that 



