ON THE NOTION OF CAUSE 201 



logical ; it does not mean that we shall be compelled to 

 do things we desire not to do, which is what people in- 

 stinctively imagine it to mean. 



As another illustration we may take the case of 

 mechanism and teleology. A syst em may be defined as 

 " mechanical " when i t_has a s et_of determinants that 

 are purelyjnatfiriaUsiich as the po sitions of ce rtain pieces 

 of matter at certain t imes. It is an open question whether 

 the world of mind and matter, as we know it, is a 

 mechanical system or not ; let us suppose, for the sake 

 of argument, that it is a mechanical system. This sup- 

 position so I contend ^throws no light whatever on the 

 question whether the universe is or is not a " teleo- 

 logical " system. It is difficult to define accurately what 

 is meant by a " teleological " system, but the argument 

 is not much affected by the particular definition we adopt. 

 Broadly, a teleological system is one in which purposes 

 are realised, i.e. in which certain desires ^those that are 

 deeper or nobler or more fundamental or more universal 

 or what not ^are followed by their realisation. Now the 

 fact ^if it be a fact ^that the universe is mechanical has 

 no bearing whatever on the question whether it is teleo- 

 logical in the above sense. There might be a mechanical 

 system in which all wishes were realised, and there might 

 be one in which all wishes were thwarted. The question 

 whether, or how far, our actual world is teleological, 

 cannot, therefore, be settled by proving that it is mechani- 

 cal, and the desire that it should be teleological is no 

 ground for wishing it to be not mechanical. 



There is, in all these questions, a very great difficulty 

 in avoiding confusion between what we can infer and 

 what is in fact determined. Let us consider, for a 

 moment, the various senses in which the future may be 

 " determined." There is one sense ^and a very important 



