KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 



AND KNOWLEDGE BY 



DESCRIPTION 



'' I ^HE object of the following paper is to consider what 

 -*- it is that we know in cases where we know pro- 

 positions about " the so-and-so " without knowing who 

 or what the so-and-so is. For example, I know that the 

 candidate who gets most votes will be elected, though I 

 do not know who is the candidate who will get most 

 votes. The problem I wish to consider is : What do we 

 know in these cases, where the subject is merelyjdescribed? 

 I have considered this problem elsewhere^ from a purely 

 logical point of view ; but in what follows I wish to con- 

 sider the question in relation to theory of knowledge as 

 well as in relation to logic, and in view of the above- 

 mentioned logical discussions, I shall in this paper make 

 the logical portion as brief as possible. 



In order to make clear the antithesis between " ac- 

 quaintance " and " description," I shall first of all try to 

 explain what I mean by " acquaintance." I say that I 

 am acquainted with an object when I have a direct 

 cognitive relation to that object, i.e. when I am directly 

 aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive 

 relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation which 

 constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes 

 presentation. In fact, I think the relation of subject and 



1 See references later. 

 P 209 



