KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 211 



obvious in the case of sight. I do not mean, of course, 

 merely that the supposed physical object is complex, but 

 that the direct sensible object is complex and contains 

 parts with spatial relations. Whether it is possible to be 

 aware of a complex without being aware of its con- 

 stituents is not an easy question, but on the whole it 

 would seem that there is no reason why it should not 

 be possible. This question arises in an acute form in 

 connection with self-consciousness, which we must now 

 briefly consider. 



In introspection, we seem to be immediately aware of 

 varying complexes, consisting of objects in various cog- 

 nitive and conative relations to ourselves. When I see 

 the sun, it often happens that I am aware of my seeing 

 the sun, in addition to being aware of the sun ; and when 

 I desire food, it often happens that I am aware of my 

 desire for food. But it is hard to discover any state of^ 

 mind in which I am aware of myself alone, as opposed to 

 a complex of which I am a constituent. The question of 

 the nature of self -consciousness is too large, and too slightly 

 connected with our subject, to be argued at length here. It 

 is difficult, but probably not impossible, to account for 

 plain facts if we assume that we do not have acquaintance 

 with ourselves. It is plain that we are not only acquainted 

 with the complex " Self-acquainted-with-A," but we also 

 know the proposition " I am acquainted with A." Now 

 here the complex has been analysed, and if " I " does not 

 stand for something which is a direct object of acquaint- 

 ance, we shall have to suppose that " I '* is something 

 known by description. If we wished to maintain the view 

 that there is no acquaintance with Self, we might argue 

 as follows : We are acquainted with acquaintance, and 

 we know that it is a relation. Also we are acquainted 

 with a complex in which we perceive that acquaintance 



