212 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



is the relating relation. Hence we know that this complex 

 must have a constituent which is that which is acquainted, 

 i.e. must have a subject-term as well as an object-term. 

 This subject-term we define as "I." Thus " I " means 

 " the subject-term in awarenesses of which / am aware." 

 But as a definition this cannot be regarded as a happy 

 effort. It would seem necessary, therefore, either to 

 suppose that I am acquainted with myself, and that " I," 

 therefore, requires no definition, being merely the proper 

 name of a certain object, or to find some other analysis 

 of self -consciousness. Thus self -consciousness cannot be 

 regarded as throwing light on the question whether we 

 can know a complex without knowing its constituents. 

 This question, however, is not important for our present 

 purposes, and I shall therefore not discuss it further. 



The awarenesses we have considered so far have all 

 been awarenesses of particular existents, and might all 

 in a large sense be called sense-data. For, from the point 

 of view of theory of knowledge, introspective knowledge 

 is exactly on a level with knowledge derived from sight 

 or hearing. But, in addition to awareness of the above 

 kind of objects, which may be called awareness 

 of particulars, we have also (though not quite in 

 the same sense) what may be called awareness of 

 universals. Awareness of universals is called conceiving, 

 and a universal of which we are aware is called a concept. 

 Not only are we aware of particular yellows, but if we 

 have seen a sufficient number of yellows and have suffi- 

 cient intelligence, we are aware of the universal yellow ; 

 this universal is the subject in such judgments as " yellow 

 differs from blue " or *' yellow resembles blue less than 

 green does." And the universal yellow is the predicate in 

 such judgments as " this is yellow," where " this " is a 

 particular sense-datum. And universal relations, too. 



