2i6 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



Common words, even proper names, are usually really 

 descriptions. That is to say, the thought in the mind of 

 a person using a proper name correctly can generally only 

 be expressed explicitly if we replace the proper name by 

 a description. Moreover, the description required to 

 express the thought will vary for different people, or for 

 the same person at different times. The only thing 

 constant (so long as the name is rightly used) is the object 

 to which the name applies. But so long as this remains 

 constant, the particular description involved usually 

 makes no difference to the truth or falsehood of the pro- 

 position in which the name appears. 



Let us take some illustrations. Suppose some state- 

 ment made about Bismarck. Assuming that there is 

 such a thing as direct acquaintance with oneself, Bismarck 

 himself might have used his name directly to designate 

 the particular person with whom he was acquainted. In 

 this case, if he made a judgment about himself, he him- 

 self might be a constituent of the judgment. Here the 

 proper name has the direct use which it always wishes to 

 have, as simply standing for a certain object, and not 

 for a description of the object. But if a person who knew 

 Bismarck made a judgment about him, the case is 

 different. What this person was acquainted with were 

 certain sense-data which he connected (rightly, we will 

 suppose) with Bismarck's body. His body as a physical 

 object, and still more his mind, were only known as the 

 body and the mind connected with these sense-data. 

 That is, they were known by description. It is, of course, 

 very much a matter of chance which characteristics of a 

 man's appearance will come into a friend's mind when 

 he thinks of him ; thus the description actually in the 

 ' friend's mind is accidental. The essential point is that 

 he knows that the various descriptions all apply to the 



