2i8 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



Bismarck, which gives importance to our judgment, the 

 thought we really have contains the one or more par- 

 ticulars involved, and otherwise consists wholly of con- 

 cepts. All names of places ^London, England, Europe, 

 the earth, the Solar System similarly involve, when 

 used, descriptions which start from some one or more 

 particulars with which we are acquainted. I suspect that 

 even the Universe, as considered by metaphysics, involves 

 such a connection with particulars. In logic, on the 

 contrary, where we are concerned not merely with what 

 does exist, but with whatever might or could exist or be, 

 no reference to actual particulars is involved. 



It would seem that, when we make a statement about 

 something only known by description, we often intend to 

 make our statement, not in the form involving the 

 description, but about the actual thing described. That 

 is to say, when we say anything about Bismarck, we 

 should like, if we could, to make the judgment which 

 Bismarck alone can make, namely, the judgment of which 

 he himself is a constituent. In this we are necessarily 

 defeated, since the actual Bismarck is unknown to us. 

 But we know that there is an object B called Bismarck, 

 and that B was an astute diplomatist. We can thus 

 describe the proposition we should like to affirm, namely, 

 " B was an astute diplomatist," where B is the object 

 which was Bismarck. What enables us to communicate 

 in spite of the varying descriptions we employ is that we 

 know there is a true proposition concerning the actual 

 Bismarck, and that, however we may vary the description 

 (so long as the description is correct), the proposition 

 described is still the same. This proposition, which is 

 described and is known to be true, is what interests us ; 

 but we are not acquainted with the proposition itself, 

 and do not know it, though we know it is true. 



