KNOWLEDGE BY ACQUAINTANCE 225 



If we are to preserve the duality of meaning and denota- 

 tion, we have to say, with Meinong, that there are such 

 objects as the golden mountain and the round square, 

 although these objects do not have being. We even have 

 to admit that the existent round square is existent, but 

 does not exist. ^ Meinong does not regard this as a con- 

 tradiction, but I fail to see that it is not one. Indeed, it 

 seems to me evident that the judgment " there is no such 

 object as the round square " does not presuppose that 

 there is such an object. If this is admitted, however, we 

 are led to the conclusion that, by parity of form, no judg- 

 ment concerning " the so-and-so " actually involves the 

 so-and-so as a constituent. 



Miss Jones 2 contends that there is no difficulty in admit- 

 ting contradictory predicates concerning such an object 

 as " the present King of France," on the ground that this 

 object is in itself contradictory. Now it might, of course, 

 be argued that this object, unlike the round square, is 

 not self -contradictory, but merely non-existent. This, 

 however, would not go to the root of the matter. The 

 real objection to such an argument is that the law of 

 contradiction ought not to be stated in the traditional 

 form ** A is not both B and not B," but in the form " no 

 proposition is both true and false." The traditional form 

 only applies to certain propositions, namely, to those 

 which attribute a predicate to a subject. When the law 

 is stated of propositions, instead of being stated concern- 

 ing subjects and predicates, it is at once evident that 

 propositions about the present King of France or the 

 round square can form no exception, but are just as in- 

 capable of being both true and false as other propositions. 



Miss Jones ^ argues that *' Scott is the author of 



^ Meinong, Ueber Annahmen, 2nd ed., Leipzig, 1910, p. 141. 

 2 Mind, July, 1910, p. 380. ^ Mind, July, 1910, p. 379. 



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