228 MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 



completed, we shall be able to reinterpret the phrase 

 " identity of denotation," which remains obscure so long 

 as it is taken as fundamental. 



The first point to observe is that, in any proposition 

 about "the author of Waverley," provided Scott is not 

 explicitly mentioned, the denotation itself, i.e. Scott, 

 does not occur, but only the concept of denotation, which 

 will be represented by a variable. Suppose we say " the 

 author of Waverley was the author of Marmion," we are 

 certainly not saying that both were Scott ^we may have 

 forgotten that there was such a person as Scott. We are 

 saying that there is some man who was the author of 

 Waverley and the author of Marmion. That is to say, 

 there is some one who wrote Waverley and Marmion, 

 and no one else wrote them. Thus the identity is that 

 of a variable, i.e. of an indefinite subject, " some one." 

 This is why we can understand propositions about " the 

 author of Waverley," without knowing who he was. 

 When we say " the author of Waverley was a poet," we 

 mean '* one and only one man wrote Waverley, and he 

 was a poet " ; when we say " the author of Waverley 

 was Scott " we mean " one and only one man wrote 

 Waverley, and he was Scott." Here the identity is 

 between a variable, i.e. an indeterminate subject (" he "), 

 and Scott ; ** the author of Waverley " has been analysed 

 away, and no longer appears as a constituent of the 

 proposition.^ 



The reason why it is imperative to analyse away the 

 phrase " the author of Waverley " may be stated as 

 follows. It is plain that when we say " the author of 

 Waverley is the author of Marmion," the is expresses 



^ The theory which I am advocating is set forth fully, with the 

 logical grounds in its favour, in Principia Mathematica, Vol. I, Intro- 

 duction, Chap. Ill ; also, less fully, in Mind, October, 1905. 



