AND CELLULAR PSYCHOLOGY. 49 



cor'ding to the monistic (or realistic) soul-hypothesis, 

 the " soul " is nothing more than the sum or aggre- 

 gate of a multitude of special cell-activities, among 

 which sensation and volition sensual perception and 

 voluntary movement are the most important, the most 

 common, and the most widely diffused ; associated with 

 these in the higher animals and in man, we .find the 

 more developed activities of the ganglionic cells which 

 are included under the conceptions of Thought, Con- 

 sciousness, Intellect, and Eeason. Like all the other 

 functional-activities of the organic cells, these soul- 

 functions depend ultimately on material phenomena 

 of motion, and more particularly on the motions of the 

 plasson-molecules or plastidules, the ultimate atoms of 

 the protoplasma, and perhaps of the nucleus also; there- 

 fore we should be able actually to grasp and explain 

 them, as well as every other cognisable natural process, 

 if we were in a position to refer them to the mechanics 

 of atoms. This monistic soul-hypothesis, then, is at 

 bottom mechanistic. If psychical mechanics psycho- 

 physics were not so infinitely complex and involved, 

 if we were in a position to take a complete view of 

 the historical evolution of the psychic functions, we 

 could reduce the whole of them (including conscious- 

 ness) to a mathematical " soul-formula." 



According to the opposite, or dualistic (or spiritu- 

 alistic) soul-hypothesis, the soul is, on the contrary, a 



