102 IGNORABIMUS ET RESTR1NGAMUR. 



say, in the introduction to his " Descent of Man," 

 "Ignorance more frequently begets confidence than 

 does knowledge : it is those who know little and not 

 those who know much who so positively assert that 

 this or that problem will never be solved by science." 

 As far as concerns the two separate limits which Du 

 Bois-Eeymond fixes for human knowledge, in my 

 opinion they are undoubtedly identical. The pro- 

 blem of the origin and nature of consciousness is 

 only a special case of the general problem of the 

 connection of matter and force. Du Bois-Eeymond 

 himself indicates that this is possible at the close of 

 his paper ; for he says, " Finally, the question arises 

 whether the two limitations to our natural knowledge 

 may not perhaps be identical ; that is to say, whether 

 if we could conceive of the true essence of matter and 

 force, we should not also understand how the substance 

 which lies at their root can, under certain given con- 

 ditions, feel, desire, and think. This conception is, no 

 doubt, the simplest, and according to admitted principles 

 of inquiry it is to be preferred to that other which it 

 confutes, and according to which, as has been said, the 

 world appears doubly incomprehensible. But it is in 

 the very nature of things that we cannot on this point 

 come to any clear conclusion, and all further words on 

 the subject are idle and so, " Ignorabimus." 



The light way in which Du Bois-Eeymond here 



