496 SALMON LEGISLA TION IN SCOTLAND. 



chairman, and should have a deliberative as well as a 

 casting vote. When we take into consideration the fact 

 that the whole history of salmon legislation, so far as we 

 have records of it, is simply a recital of the battles and 

 disputes between upper and lower proprietors, born of the 

 deep conviction of the former that their interests - were 

 entirely overridden by those of the lower proprietors, it 

 seems strange that the Legislature should not have foreseen 

 the effect of this stipulation with regard to the chairman. 

 As the largest proprietor is naturally always a lower 

 proprietor, the effect was to give the lower proprietors 

 a majority of votes at every full meeting of the board. If 

 one of the lower proprietors were absent, they would still 

 have it all their own way, by means of the casting vote of 

 the chairman. This was simply aggravating the grievances 

 under which the upper proprietors had so long groaned, 

 and it is not at all surprising that their cordial co-operation 

 in the new system was not secured. Of course it may be 

 said that the lower proprietors ought to have the majority 

 in votes as they have the majority in value. This may be 

 true as a general principle, but it is not applicable to the 

 circumstances existing between the upper and lower pro- 

 prietors. If the former had obtained what they believe to 

 be the justice they seek, and the, as it were, personal 

 question had been eliminated, it would have been another 

 matter. It may, however, be asked, "Who is to be the 

 chairman ? " If not a lower proprietor, is he to be an upper 

 proprietor? This again would place the power in the 

 hands of the upper proprietors, a result which would not 

 be desirable either. There are two ways of answering the 

 question. 1st. Let the members elect their own chairman 

 from among themselves. If they were satisfied to entrust 

 the power voluntarily to one of their own number, whether 



