MEDIEVAL AND MODERN PRODUCE MARKETS 849 



not actually representative of existing conditions. The squeeze 

 is frequently confused with the corner, particularly by outsiders 

 and by academic writers. The market operators are not likely 

 to use the term "corner," and though their attempts to deny the 

 occurrence of corners have not been well received, their inten- 

 tion of drawing a sharp distinction between the corner and the 

 squeeze would seem to be well founded. The corner is the char- 

 acteristic speculative transaction of the unorganized markets. 

 The operator buys actual stuff with the intent to store it for a 

 while. When he has secured substantial control of the supply, 

 he begins to sell at such prices as he chooses because none can 

 compete with him. . The only limit is the ability and disposition 

 of the consumer to pay the price asked rather than do without. 

 The transaction, it will be observed, rests entirely with the in- 

 dividual operator. If his means are sufficient he can make a 

 corner at any time. The squeeze is different in every essential 

 particular. The bull operator buys both spot stuff and futures, 

 but at the same time he must sell to the trade. It is his object 

 to induce the bears to sell more stuff for delivery in some month 

 in the future than they will then be able to secure except at 

 greatly enhanced prices. Consequently, he has an interest in 

 depleting the stocks on the primary market by sales to the trade. 

 This continuous selling to the trade in the interval before the 

 squeeze is the most essential difference between the squeeze and 

 the old corner. It is also worthy of note that a squeeze opera- 

 tion cannot be worked up at will by either bulls or bears. There 

 will be no squeeze unless the bears sell excessive amounts on 

 short contracts ; even if the bears are really too optimistic about 

 the future there can be no squeeze unless the bulls are willing 

 to accept the challenge. The squeeze will arise only in those 

 circumstances which produce a marked difference of opinion. In 

 such an operation the party whose judgment of the conditions 

 was the more accurate will gain. The famous Leiter deal in 

 wheat of 1898 was disastrous to Mr. Leiter; the Patten wheat 

 deal in 1909 was as conspicuously successful. These operations 

 arise when real scarcity occurs for reasons that were not antici- 

 pated by the bears, either an unexpected shortage of crop or 



