8o8 THE POPULAR SCIENCE MONTHLY. 



ported by possession was impossible ; and the question of com- 

 patibility was so closely reasoned through all its possible ramifi- 

 cations that there are few minor topics in any science that have 

 elicited a more searching analysis, or which present a greater 

 mass of subtle distinctions. 



Of the body of abstruse rules thus evolved, it will be impos- 

 sible within the limits of this paper to convey any adequate con- 

 ception. It may be explained, however, that the door through 

 which future estates were admitted into our law was the theory 

 that the perpetual right of enjoyment implied from possession 

 was an entire estate, which, by words used at the time of delivery, 

 could, in point of time, be carved up into a number of fractions, 

 to be successively enjoyed by different persons ; and that as all 

 these persons combined took only one entire estate, a single de- 

 livery would suffice for all, the taker of the first fraction being 

 construed to receive the possession on behalf of all. Thus if de- 

 livery of land to A were accompanied by declaration or deed to 

 the effect that A should have it for a term of years, then B for 

 his life, the remainder of the estate after B's death to go to C and 

 his heirs forever, these future estates to B and C were deemed 

 valid, because B and C were regarded as in on the possession de- 

 livered to A. 



This theory was countenanced only upon the ground that the 

 total of the several fractional estates, thus created by a single act, 

 was precisely equivalent to the one perpetual and uninterrupted 

 right of enjoyment, which could be conferred upon one person by 

 a single delivery. Any proposed future estate which could not 

 be justified by a strict application of this theory was legally im- 

 possible. Hence, if by the terms of the delivery, or by reason of 

 any subsequent contingency, the several fractions were not, or 

 ceased to be, the exact equivalent of one entire estate, the future 

 estates either never arose, or forthwith collapsed. There could, 

 therefore, be no future estate, unless supported by a prior and 

 present estate created by the same act ; and each fractional estate 

 must be such as to take effect in possession immediately upon the 

 determination of the next preceding estate ; otherwise lib was void, 

 and necessarily involved all succeeding estates in the ruin. 



This stringent limitation arose into great importance, and 

 indeed became the source of a large part of the law of future 

 estates, when at a later day, upon grounds unnecessary and per- 

 haps difficult to reproduce, it was held permissible to create future 

 estates, doubtful or contingent as to the time when, or persons in 

 whom, they should vest. Thus delivery might be made to A for 

 his life, then to go for life to B's eldest soq (not yet born), then 

 forever to C and his heirs. Here it was a matter of contingency 

 when, if ever, B would have a son. If A died before the birth of 



